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Abstract. Phishing attacks are a common tool used by malicious actors
to gain access to systems or exploit individuals. Much of the phishing
detection schemes focuses on awareness training programs and detection
models. While these methods, detection models utilizing machine learn-
ing techniques, blacklists, and other email characteristics such as domain
names, email addresses, and URLs are helpful in combating the problem,
more research is needed in order to detect phishing scams more accu-
rately and precisely where phishing email data can play an important
role. Nowadays phishing attacks exploit human vulnerabilities by target-
ing specific human emotions, such as fear, to trick users into giving up
their personal information. Consideration of the emotional exploitation
present in phishing emails data combined with current detection schemes
could lead to better detection. The goal of this paper is to analyze the
emotional related content of a phishing email dataset to see if there is any
relation between the emotion exploited and the sender’s email domain.
In addition, this research demonstrates the need for the collection and
analysis of the various types of phishing emails and its related emotional
content that can be beneficial in developing better detection methods.
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1 Introduction
Phishing emails are a form of fraudulent attempt by malicious actors to gain
access to personal and organizational computer systems causing financial and
credentials losses [16]. Phishing emails often exploit individuals’ emotional and
sentimental vulnerabilities to obtain access to people’s personal information and
sensitive credentials [17]. Despite numerous efforts on the detection and devel-
opment of filtering systems, phishing emails continue to attract users’ attention
and pose a serious computer security vulnerability. Cyber-attacks via phishing
emails leave a great negative impact and cost on an organization’s revenue and
further remediation and regulation [14]. Moreover, the loss of user’s data can
potentially lead to loss of reputation and trust for an organization [13].
Phishing attacks are used to gain access to a system by sending fake emails
disguised to be from legitimate sources. These emails could be requesting user-
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websites that imitate real websites, tricking users into entering their personal
information. Spear-phishing is a targeted phishing attack where an individual
or group of individuals is targeted. The phishing email content is tailored to a
person or group in order to gain access to a system that the target has access
to. Humans are considered the weakest link in the security world, and phishing
attacks take advantage of this by exploiting human vulnerabilities. Phishing is
involved in 32% of all confirmed data breaches [3]. Attacker groups are especially
fond of phishing as 65% of these groups use spear phishing has their primary in-
fection vector [4]. Since phishing emails are designed to look legitimate, detection
remains a much-researched topic. Existing phishing countermeasures include se-
curity awareness training programs and various detection models. These models
focus on analyzing the senders’ domain names, associated email addresses, and
URLs to determine if an email is malicious or not [5]. However, some researchers
[5] are trying to use natural language processing, sentiment analysis, and other
methods to use the content of an email to determine its level of maliciousness
to improve existing detection tools.
Majority of the phishing detection schemes focus on awareness training pro-
grams and detection models, employing machine learning techniques [15], using
blacklists including URL, domain names and email addresses. While all of these
approaches have combated phishing emails and have reduced the frequency of
exploitation, more research is needed to detect phishing scams more accurately
and precisely, especially focusing on human’s vulnerabilities. Using social engi-
neering techniques, phishing emails often exploit human vulnerabilities by tar-
geting specific human emotions, such as fear, trust, and anticipation to trick
users into giving up their personal information [1]. While previous studies have
focused on persuasion techniques adopted in phishing attacks [2], there is still a
research gap on how phishing emails target different human emotions and how
this strategy can be combined with current detection schemes to achieve better
security measures. Therefore, the goal of this paper is to analyze the emotional
triggers that appear in phishing email datasets collected from educational and
industry organizations, and determine if there are any significant differences in
the types of human sentiments that are exploited in these emails. We believe this
investigation can guide and influence design considerations for existing detection
systems which will be more human centered. To achieve this goal our specific
research questions were as follows:
RQ1: Is there a difference in the types of emotions and sentiments that are
exploited in the various phishing email datasets that we examined?
RQ2: What are the most frequently used emotions and sentiments exploited
in each set of the phishing emails as well as the cumulative database?
We conducted this research with publicly available datasets from two educa-
tional institutions and two non-educational datasets. Our analysis process was
divided into 4 steps which are coding, pre-processing, analyzing with rule-based
sentiment analyzer and extracting emotions score by using tokenization.
In this paper, we will present some experimentation on the effect of the type
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thermore, we will describe our experimentation with finding relations between
the emotional content of a phishing email and sender’s email domain (educa-
tional, non-educational). Through the analyses, we would be able to see if there
is any correlation between the domain of the sender email and the sentiment of
the email content is trying to exploit.
2 Background
There have been different approaches when it comes to examining and detect-
ing phishing emails such as URL analysis, webpage content analysis, phishing
detection schemes, email content and to educate end users to identify phishing
content. Common phishing detection schemes fall under two categories: user ed-
ucation and software [6]. User education consists of security training programs
where users are trained to be aware of and recognize common signs of a phish-
ing attack. Software solutions focus on detecting phishing attacks on a systems
level using machine learning techniques, blacklisting, and visual similarities [6].
Many of the existing detection schemes rely on email metadata such as domain
names, associated email addresses, and URLs. While these techniques are useful
and help to mitigate phishing attacks, many phishing scams claim victims by
exploiting human vulnerabilities. To help improve detection schemes, researchers
have started to analyze the content of these phishing emails to better understand
how scammers are exploiting human vulnerabilities through social engineering
approach.
Email contents or text have high dimensionality and complexity, and thus
present a large number of features to be analyzed. Analysis on such a large
dataset is slow and leads to poor classifier performance [7], [18]. Researchers
use dimensionality reduction techniques such as feature extraction or feature
selection to reduce this dimensionality and make it easier to do analysis on
email contents. Researchers are also looking into what techniques and language
is used in phishing emails to exploit human vulnerabilities. Attackers can exploit
certain emotional triggers such as a user’s fear and anticipation by using targeted
words and subjects [5]. A better understanding of how attackers exploit human
emotions would lead to the ability to create better detection schemes.
In this experiment, we aim to build off of the work done by Sharma and
Bashir [5] by conducting sentiment analysis on a phishing email dataset to see
what types of sentiments can be extracted from email contents and how best
to extract them. This information will help further research into using email
content to help aide phishing detection. Understanding the way human emotions
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3 Method
3.1 Data Coding and Initial Analysis
We first Coded the emails into email body, email subject, sender domain, and
email signature. Our source of email are: 2 public educational databases (“Berke-
ley Information Security Office” and “SecureIT-Kent State University”), 2 non-
educational databases. In this initial stage, we used NLTK Vader Sentiment
Analyzer, a lexicon and rule-based sentiment analysis tool for Preliminary Sen-
timent analysis.
3.2 Polarity Scoring
To start off the experimentation, we wanted to use a simple tool that would
allow us to get a rough idea of what sort of sentiments were expressed in the
phishing email dataset. This is why we decided to start off using the NLTK Vader
Sentiment Analyzer, a lexicon and rule-based sentiment analysis tool [9]. While it
is intended for use in social media posts, the tool is fast and does not require any
training data, which made it ideal for the initial experimentation. The NLTK
Punkt Tokenizer was used because it can differentiate between periods that
end sentences and periods used in words like “Mr. Bach” or “Mrs. Smith”.
Furthermore, it also can recognize that sentences can start with non-capitalized
words [8]. This makes it useful in tokenizing email content because some emails
do not exhibit formal English language techniques.
NLTK Punkt Tokenizer In order to pre-process the dataset, we used the
NLTK Punkt Tokenizer to split up the email contents into sentences. This would
allow the Sentiment Intensity Analyzer to analyze each sentence individually
rather than as a whole paragraph. This tokenizer take in dataset and put infor-
mation into data structure called rows and go through each entry row and check
to see if there is a sender email. If yes, then separate the results into different
lists in the results dictionary based on the email domain of the sender. It then
tokenize the email content using english.pickle tokenizer from nltk Once results
calculated for each row, print out the average compound sentiment value for
each domain and output results. However, it may be useful to run the Sentiment
Intensity Analyzer on the full paragraph without tokenization so the email as
a whole is analyzed. The results section contains the polarity scores with and
without the usage of the English pickle tokenizer.
NLTK Sentiment Intensity Analyzer The NLTK Sentiment Intensity Ana-
lyzer was used to score the data. The analyzer gives the input message a positive,
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3.3 Emotion Extraction
In this process, it takes in dataset and put information into a data structure
called rows and then clean message text and simplify it down to a list of words
that provide some sort of info on the sentiment of the sentence. After that, it
compares each word to the dictionary and see if any of them are in there. If they
are, add the corresponding emotion to the emotions list array. Once each row
has been processed, it counts up all the emotions that have been extracted to
see which one is most prevalent.
Text Cleaning Following the method used by Attreya Bhatt [10], we cleaned
the text data by converting the text to lowercase and removing punctuation so
that only the words remained.
Tokenization Once the text was cleaned, the text was tokenized using a word
tokenizer that simply created a list of all the words in the cleaned text.
Stop Words The stop words were then removed from the tokenized text using
a stop words list from NLTK. If the list contained a stop word found in the
NLTK list, it was removed from the final list of tokenized words.
Emotion List To extract emotion data from the tokenized words, we used a
dictionary of words matched with their related emotion. Most of the lexicons
we found only provided positive or negative sentiments associated with different
words, such as SentiWordNet [11] and TextBlob [13], but the one we ended up
using, provided by Bhatt [10], had words mapped to their emotion rather than
a positive or negative value. This dictionary is by no means an exhaustive list.
The emotions expressed are then tallied using a counter module and outputted
as a result.
4 Data and Results
4.1 Dataset
Dataset 1 containing data on 500 separate phishing emails from educational in-
stitution. This dataset was provided by [5]. It contained the following columns:
EmailSubject, EmailContent, SendingDate, SendingT ime, Day, URLT itle,
Coined.Word, SenderName, SenderT itle, ClosingRemarks, SenderEmail, Logo,
and To. Dataset 2 and 3 contain non education data from kaggle 1 and data con-
taining both ham and spam email from kaggle 2.
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4.2 Findings from Dataset-1
Overall Polarity Scores After scoring all of the phishing email data with the
Vader Sentiment Analyzer, we took the averages of each category (compound,
positive, negative, and neutral) over all of the email content data, shown in
Table 1. The positive, negative, and neutral values represent a percentage of
the text that fall into those categories. The sum of these values should be 1.
The compound score represents a normalized value that falls between -1 (most
negative) and 1 (most positive). Figures 1-4 are histograms of all the datapoints
for each category (compound, neutral, positive, and negative). We can see that
most of the compound values fall between -0.2 and 0, most of them being 0. The
positive and negative values sit mostly between 0.0 and 0.2, while the neutral
values sit between 0.6 and 1.0, depending on tokenization. In this paper, if the
data is tokenized, that means that the NLTK Tokenizer was used to break the
email contents into sentences instead of running the sentiment analyzer on each
email content as a whole.





Table 1: Overall Avg. Scores for data-points by sentiment analyzer
Polarity Scores By Domain The polarity scores were calculated in the same
fashion as above, but in this section, averages were taken based on sender email
domain. For example, the email “records@dol.gov” would be grouped with other
emails ending in .gov. This was done to see if there was any correlation between
the email domain, and the sentiment of the email. Due to the small amount of
datapoints containing email domain information in this dataset, no conclusions
can adequately be drawn by these results. Table 2 shows the results without
tokenizing the email contents (meaning analyzing each email as a whole), while
Table 3 shows the results with tokenization (analyzing each email sentence by
sentence).
Emotion Extraction Phase II was our attempt at further analyzing the email
contents after realizing polarity scores did not give as much insight into the data
as we wanted. In this phase, we tokenized each email content data point into
words, removed those words that did not provide any insight into the emotional
content of the email, and then compared the resulting list of words with a dic-
tionary matching words to the respective emotion they represent. Each time
an emotion was tallied, it was added to a counter. In the end, each emotion
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Fig. 1: With/out tokenized polarity scores
type Comp Pos Neg Neu
.com 0.134 0.091 0.112 0.797
.gov 0.517 0.126 0.0 0.875
.net 0.465 0.179 0.0 0.821
.edu 0.651 0.197 0.007 0.796
.org 0.36 0.125 0.011 0.864
none 0.058 0.116 0.049 0.835
type Comp Pos Neg Neu
.com 0.064 0.139 0.069 0.792
.gov 0.258 0.076 0.0 0.924
.net 0.26 0.216 0.0 0.784
.edu 0.308 0.178 0.005 0.817
.org 0.203 0.164 0.01 0.826
none 0.059 0.119 0.046 0.836
Table 2: Polarity score by domain: a) shows the results without tokenizing the
email contents (meaning analyzing each email as a whole), while b) shows the
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Fig. 2: Emotion Extraction from dataset 1
4.3 Findings from Dataset 2 and 3
For the dataset 2 and 3, we have followed the similar method, after scoring all
of the email data with the Vader Sentiment Analyzer, we took the averages of
each category (compound, positive, negative, and neutral) over all of the email
content data. The positive, negative, and neutral values represent a percentage
of the text that fall into those categories. The sum of these values should be 1.
The compound score represents a normalized value that falls between -1 (most
negative) and 1 (most positive). Figures 3 are histograms of all the datapoints
for each category (compound, neutral, positive, and negative). We can see that
most of the Enron compound values fall between 0.8 and 1. The negative values
sit mostly between 0.0 and 0.2. The neutral values mostly sit between 0.8 and 1.
The positive values sit mostly between 0.0 and 0.2. The overall polarity scores
are: compound: 0.581, neg: 0.022, neu: 0.878, pos: 0.099
Similarly for dataset 3, after scoring all of the spam email data with the
Vader Sentiment Analyzer, we took the averages of each category (compound,
positive, negative, and neutral) over all of the email content data. The positive,
negative, and neutral values represent a percentage of the text that fall into those
categories. The sum of these values should be 1. The compound score represents
a normalized value that falls between -1 (most negative) and 1 (most positive).
Figures 4 are histograms of all the datapoints for each category (compound,
neutral, positive, and negative). We can see that most of the ham compound
values fall between -0.8 and 1, most of them being 0. Most of the spam compound
values fall between -0.8 and 1, most of them being 1. The ham and spam positive
and negative values sit mostly between 0.0 and 0.2. The ham neutral values
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Fig. 3: With/out tokenized polarity scores for dataset2
5 Discussion
Results of these analyses show a clear difference in the types of emotions and
sentiments that are included among the three datasets. For example, educational
institution’s phishing emails are leaning more towards trust, anticipation, and
fear, while the other datasets that include industries show different emotions like
attachment, fear, and attraction. Although our study results are exploratory and
more research is needed to confirm these findings, we believe that our methodol-
ogy can provide a step forward towards better detection mechanisms that include
human vulnerabilities that can easily be exploited. In addition, our research
demonstrates the need for a universal database that can collect and share all
types of phishing emails across different kinds of institutions in order to capture
the various emotional triggers and sentiments that attackers may use to exploit
via phishing attacks. This will also improve individual organizations efforts in
defending against phishing email on their own which may fail due to the lack of
a comprehensive set of emotions and sentiments that can be utilized. Therefore,
our study presents a preliminary step towards building a comprehensive and
consolidated emotional/sentimental dataset that can help in the detection and
deterring of phishing email which continues to be a costly endeavor for many
organizations.
Overall, results may vary based on the type of dataset tested. In order to test
this question more in-depth, we experimented sender email domain information
across pure phishing datasets as well as spam and ham datasets in dataset3. This
would allow us to see the consistent correlation between sender email domain
and the emotional content of the email. Our analysis of ham emails as well show
that values differ or hold true whether or not the email is legitimate or not in
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Due to the limitations of this experiment, the results do not give generalized
recommendation which can draw strong conclusions for all types of phishing
email data. The initial dataset was small, having only 500 entries, and of those,
only 32 of those data points had email domain information. Datasets Two and
Three were significantly larger. This makes the results from Phase 1 noninforma-
tive in determining the relation between sender email domain and positive and
negative emotion. If tested on a much larger dataset with sender domain data,
we would be able to see if there is any correlation between the domain and the
emotional content of the email. In terms of the effect of tokenization on the po-
larity results, we do see that the tokenized averages lend more towards positive
polarity. However, if we look at the histograms in figures 1 and 2 there does not
seem to be a large difference in clusters of the compound, negative, and positive
polarity values between tokenized and untokenized data for this specific dataset.
We do see a difference in the neutral polarity values. The untokenized values
a higher percentage of neutral scores in the 0.6-0.8 range than the tokenized
values.
The results of Phase 2 of emotion extraction of the experimentation may
also be slightly unreliable due to the limitations of the dictionary word. Certain
words such as “urgently”, “expiring”, and “disregard”, which provide some sense
of the type of emotions present in the email, are not in the dictionary. Thus,
some words that are important to understanding the emotional content of the
text are left unanalyzed.
6 Conclusion
Though this experiment had a few limitations including dataset size and proper
emotion mapping techniques, further experimentation would be useful to inves-
tigate the relation between sender email domain and emotional content, if any.
Future studies would benefit from running analytics on a larger dataset of both
spam and ham data types, allowing for any relations between the emotions ex-
ploited and the maliciousness of an email. In order to more accurately gauge the
emotional content of the email data, machine learning techniques could be used
to help classify the overall emotional content of the data. This would be a more
accurate method of emotion extraction.
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